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Abstract
Numerical identity is the non-relational sameness of an object to it-
self. It is concerned with understanding how entities undergo change
and maintain their identity. In substance metaphysics, an entity is
considered a substance with an essence and such an essence is the
source of its power. However, such a framework fails to explain the
sense in which an entity is still the entity it was, amidst changes. Those
who claim that essence is unaffected by existence are faced with chal-
lenge of exploring the epistemic access to such an essence, which is
questionable at best. Process metaphysics is a strong candidate for a
theory that can ontologically explain regularity and change without
appeal to essence. Process and its interactions is the main category.
Every process is an emergent organization of constitutive interactions
and is individuated on the basis of its interactive powers, that is, the
ways in which it interacts with the world around it. Interactions are
situated adaptation to changes. In this way, changes are crucial within
process metaphysics and are included in the starting point of its in-
vestigation. What seems to the naked eyes as one-ness/singularity
is a complex process where an organization of interactions is emerg-
ing from moment to moment by continually adapting to the changes
around and within it. The question of numerical identity over time
becomes valid only within substance metaphysics which has no space
to accommodate change, due to its allegiance to essence.
Keywords — numerical identity, metaphysics, substance, process, in-
teraction, essence
1 Introduction
Identity is a foundational component of contemporary metaphysics, primarily
conceived as a relation and often discussed with respect to objects (with itself
1
or between two or more objects). In case of numerical identity, an object x
is related to itself, in an absolute and non-relational sense, that is, ‘x is
x ’. Qualitative identity is the relation of sameness of qualities between two
or more objects. My concern in this paper is with numerical identity and
more specifically, with the ontology of identity, that is, the nature of objects
involved in identity claims.
2 Thesis
1. The question of whether an entity is numerically identical to itself over
time is only valid within substance metaphysics, where substance is
inseparable from its essence and essence is source of the identity of
entities;
2. Substance metaphysics fails to explain the regularity of an object,
amidst changes and its appeal to essence is questionable, owing to lat-
ter’s epistemic inaccessibility;
3. A metaphysical framework that can explain ontological regularity along
with change without appeal to essence would be more adequate;
4. In process metaphysics, the world is populated by processes; such pro-
cesses are emergent organizations of interactions and have interactive
powers, that is, ways to interact with the world around them;
5. There are constitutive interactions and processual interactions: an or-
ganization of constitutive interactions leads to emergence of process
and such a process carries out interactions with the world around it.
These interactions are in reciprocal dependency relationship with each
other;
6. Interactions are situated adaptation to changes;
7. What we encounter in the world is not concrete singularities but pro-
cesses which are continuously emerging from moment to moment through
their situated adaptation to changes.
3 Numerical Identity
[IN] Numerical identity is the non-relational sameness of an object to itself (x
is x ). Numerical identity is intended to direct towards one-ness of an object.
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What constitutes such a oneness is much debated, as is the claim that an
object shares absolute qualitative identity only to itself.
Some things are one in respect of number, some in respect of
form, some in respect of genus, some in respect of analogy; in
number, those whose matter is one, in form those whose account
is one.1
There are broadly two ways in which numerical identity has been studied:
firstly, under the language of identity, where the concern has been to talk
about informativeness of identity statements; secondly, under the ontology
of identity, where the concern is with the nature of entities involved in such
identity statements. My domain of research is the latter, and I will be talking
about nature of the entities described in identity statements.
4 Ontology of Identity
Discussions on identity generally take two forms: firstly, focused on relation
of identity and secondly, on nature of objects being related/identified.
[1] Table x is table x.
An exposition on the ‘is’, emphasis on the criterion for identity and how
the criterion holds in relationships of different kinds falls broadly under the
first form while exploring nature of the object (table, in this case), with
or without reference to temporality (amongst other categories) is classified
as under the latter. This paper focuses on the second form of ontology,
discussing the nature of entities.
5 Substance Ontology: Chunky Theories
This section discusses the predominant framework in contemporary meta-
physics today, the neo-Aristotelian substance metaphysics and advances two
main points:
1. The question of numerical identity is reasonable only within substance
metaphysics;
1. E. J. Lowe, “Two Notions of Being: Entity and Essence” [in en], Royal Institute
of Philosophy Supplements 62 (July 2008): 23–48, accessed January 24, 2018, doi:10.
1017/S1358246108000568, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/royal-
institute-of-philosophy-supplements/article/two-notions-of-being-entity-
and-essence/B36B5BEA4173D8382A55D0753AD86BC7.
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2. Substance, in terms of essence, is inadequate to account for supposed
numerical identity.
5.1 Substance
Substance-oriented metaphysical theory understands the world around us
primarily through the category of substance and its properties. Borrowing
from Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz , the intuitive notion of
substance is that an individual substance has features which are unified by
it. Such features do not form part of the substance, as shape or size of a
table would not be considered its parts. If an individual substance exists
at a time, then it possibly exists at more than that time. Some individual
substance persists through changes in their intrinsic features while others
persist through changes in their relational features. The length of time of
existence of a substance is accidental.2 These substances are made up of
‘c/hunk of matter’. Theories which posit substance as fundamental to reality
and consider such substance made up of chunk/hunk of matter are labelled
Chunky Theories in this paper.
We call substances [what is] not predicated of a subject but ev-
erything else is predicated of [it]. That which, being present in
such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of
their beingThe parts which are present in such things, limiting
them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruc-
tion the whole is destroyedThe essence, the formula of which is a
definition, is also called the substance of each thing.3
The identity of substances is primitive in the sense of being un-
analysable. A substance is individuated by its matter. Which
substance it is (i.e. of what kind) is given by its form, but its
identity conditions are not given by those of its form The sub-
stance has an identity- it is one or another kind of thing- and
its identity is traceable through time. But it has no conditions of
identity, nothing else that has to be true in order for it to have the
identity it has or to be reidentifiable A substance is in some sense
an ontologically independent entity. It has existence in itself and
2. Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz, “Substance Among Other Categories,”
Mind 109, no. 433 (2000): 149–152.
3. Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924; New-
ton Abbot: Sandpiper Books, 1997), 1017b (hereafter cited as Aristot. Met.).
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by virtue of itself as an ultimate distinct subject of being.4
5.2 Substance to Essence
The essence of a substance is what it is 5. Though there are heated debates
about the nature of such an essence (that is, its fundamentality, whether it
is ontologically in/dependent or the grounding relation of an object to its
fundamental entities), a commonality between the chunky theories, is their
allegiance to essence.
[Ex] Essence of x is what-x -is or what-it-is-to-be-x.
Essence is explored in many ways and can be minimally defined as ‘x is
what it is in virtue of/owing to its essence’. Further qualifications can be
made to this definition to account for the type of substance x is and for other
categorizable features (general essence).
5.3 Substance to Essence to Numerical Identity
Within substance ontology, numerical identity is axiomatic, in the sense that,
it is a core tenet on essentiality of the object. When one asserts ‘x is x ’,
it points out, in a sense, to the irreducible nature of the object, which is
reflective of its essentiality. In saying ‘x is x ’, the claim is ‘There is essence.
x is what it is.’. Thus, the starting point of numerical identity is that we
are, at a crucial level, capturing its essence.
[2] Tablex
e is Tablex
e where e refers to the essence.
Then, while talking about numerical identity of tablex, in saying that
‘Tablex is tablex’, I am pointing to its essence: ‘There is essence to tableex.’.
Such an essence is self-contained and is considered to be the source of being
of the object.
[3] Tablex
e
at-time-t is the Tablex
e
at-time-t*
When a reference to time is made and numerical identity is asserted, we
have to account for the changes that the tablex undergoes and if it does go
4. David S. Oderberg, Real essentialism, Routledge studies in contemporary philoso-
phy 11, OCLC: ocm85898989 (New York ; London: Routledge, 2007), p.78.
5. Properties belonging to a substance are either essential or accidental. These are also
variously called relational and non-relational, dispositional and categorical. The essential
properties typify the substance (determines the kind of substance it is i.e. general essence)
while the accidental qualities are subject to change and do not determine nature of the
substance. A common debate is the relation of essence to essential properties. The essential
properties can be posited as determining the individual essence: the essential properties
make x what it is. However, there are challenges to associating essence with essential
properties including the need to explicate relation between substance and the essential
properties, of whether the substance is merely a bundle of such essential properties.
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through such changes, then in what way it affects the essence. The answer
usually is that the essence is unaffected by the existence of tablex, that is,
by changes which occur in virtue of its participation in the world. Attempts
to talk about identity of substance through time have led to largely two
positions: perdurance and endurance.
Perdurance says that material objects persist through time via temporal
parts/stages. These temporal stages exist at different times and can be dif-
ferentiated with reference to the times of their existence. This means that at
any one point, only a certain part of the object exists. The object is divided
into a series of temporal parts: table-on-Monday, table-at-2pm and so on.
Such a position is also called four-dimensionalism where time is considered
to be a fourth dimension, along with three spatial dimensions. Persistent
objects are four-dimensional entities. This position has been advocated by
Quine (1975), Lewis (1983), Armstrong (1980), Heller (1990) and Hudson
(2001) amongst others. The challenge to four-dimensionalism is that prop-
erties are generally attributed to objects and not to its temporal parts. The
inclusion of temporality as parts is incompatible with the framework of sub-
stance and its properties where the properties are applied to the substance
and not to a substance reserved to a temporal stage.
Endurance position claims at material objects are wholly present at each
time and that there are only spatial and no temporal parts. Endurance po-
sition is supported by Thomson (1965), Simons (2000), van Inwagen (1990)
and Oderberg (2004) However, endurance position faces the challenge of ex-
plicating the criterion of essence and how one accesses it, a charge put up
against the broad concept of essence as well.
When a reference to time is made, the question of numerical identity is
to explain in what sense tablex is still the tablex. The concept of essence is
invoked to warrant that though there are changes occurring in the world, the
substance is unaffected owing to its immutable essence.
5.4 Three non-modal accounts of essence and their in-
adequacies
For the purposes of this paper, I have chosen three non-modal accounts of
essence. My claim is that all these accounts presuppose a chunky theory of
reality and fail to resolve the question of what-essence-is and the access to
essence. The questionability of essence moves one towards alternate ways to
understanding identity of an object. Owing to limitation of space, I have
provided terribly condensed versions of the accounts.
Kit Fine provides an account where the essence of something is that which
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is stated in its real definition. A real definition of x tells us what-x -is and
not simply how to use the word. However, he fails to provide a clear idea of
what a real definition is and how it is to be constructed.
Joseph Almog explores the distinction between essence and accident in
terms of generation. He takes the example of model, Nastassja Kinski and
says, ‘My own theoretical account traces the forging of her essential traits
to the generative process by which she came into being .’. The main idea
is that every object comes to exist through a historical process and it is
possible to distinguish between essential and accidental properties on basis
of their relation to such a historical process. Those features that come to
exist through this process are essential while those which come to exist for
other reasons are accidental. Almogs account does not tell us where we are
to draw the line in tracing such a generative process. Moreover, as Michael
Gorman points out it is hard to imagine that we could give an account of
the essence of the table-generation process without giving an account of the
essence of tables.6
Michael Gorman grasps essentiality as foundationality, through the con-
cept of support relations. ‘Let a and b stand for things and let F and G stand
for features possessed by a and b, respectively. Whenever we want to talk
about somethings being the case because something else is the case, the full
formulation will look like this: a is F because b is G.’ (Gorman 2014, 127).
He takes example of an atom and a car to demonstrate: A certain hydrogen
atom is prone to bond at least because it has one proton; My car is the
temperature that it is because its heater is on. Support relations are these
kinds of because relations, which cannot be reduced to other prior kinds of
relations. He proposes that there is at least one unsupported feature while
there are many other supported ones through different layers of support. The
unsupported one is called foundational. He avoids infinite regress by intro-
ducing that there is at least one foundational feature. F is a foundational
feature of a if and only if a is F and there is no G such that as being G sup-
ports as being F. Here, a stands for some-thing and F/G refers to some real
features. That feature is essential which is unsupported and thus, founda-
tional. However, there is no systematic way to determine the criteria for such
unsupported feature, since it is possible to trace relational underpinnings to
every feature attributed to an entity.
In neo-Aristotelian contemporary metaphysics, accounts of essence are
embedded within chunky theories, that is, theories which talk about an object
6. Michael Gorman, “Essentiality as Foundationality,” in Neo-Aristotelian perspectives
in metaphysics, ed. Daniel Novotny´ and Luka´sˇ Nova´k, Routledge studies in metaphysics 8
(New York ; London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), p.124.
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x and its properties. There has been a gradual shift from talk of essence to
talk of essential properties. This reflects that the scholars working in the do-
main have taken notice of the need for relational underpinnings in an account
of objects, owing to the realization that there is rarely any empirically heavy
evidence for an absolutely independent substance. However, in such a shift,
the object has been reduced to a bundle of properties: essential/accidental,
categorical/dispositional, relational/non-relational. Expositions on essence
are crowded with accounts of distinction between such properties.
Those accounts which continue loyalty to substantial essence fail to pro-
vide a strategic account of its access. The epistemic access to essence is ques-
tionable, at best. Though there are reasons why we need such an essence,
there is no systematic method to access it. In his illuminating paper on
epistemology of access, Tuomas Tahko remarks:
To conclude, it seems that Lowe has given us an intriguing picture
of the role of a priori knowledge in the epistemology of essence,
but this picture does need to be completed with the help of em-
pirical elements. If this is right, then it would be a mistake to
describe Lowes account as purely rationalist, even in the sense
that we first grasp the essences of possible entities a priori and
then proceed to determine which ones of them actually exist with
the help of empirical evidence. Instead, we can see that Lowes
account assumes a subtle interplay of a priori and a posteriori
elements, which may, properly interpreted, come close to a type
of hybrid view about the epistemology of essence.7
Thus, within chunky theories, we encounter the world as an arrangement
of substances with essences and intuitively accept that each of these substance
is singular-one over time. Such a picture of the world is also highly compatible
with our common sense. However, we have no access to such an essence and
due to the inability to explicate the essence, there is no way to validate how
the substance is still one in spite of the changes it undergoes through its
interaction with the world.
6 Spatial Sameness and Identity
It is important to differentiate between spatial sameness and identity. Spatial
sameness is the common-sense notion of shape and size. In discussions on
7. Tuomas E. Tahko, “The epistemology of essence” (2016), http://www.ttahko.net/
papers/epistofessence.pdf.
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numerical identity, questions like: Would the tablex still be tablex if it lost a
leg? are plenty. Here, tablex is being identified with its spatial qualities, its
shape and size. If being-one means to be of that particular shape and size,
then one would have to admit that tablex is not tablex- if it changes shape
or size. However, one could counter that even after loss of a leg, tablex could
still be considered tablex. How can we justify such an attribution? This calls
for a mention of the criterion for identity.
One could answer either that tablex is still able to fulfil the functions it
previously did with mild alteration (functional justification) and thus, it is
still tablex or that, even if it lost all of its legs and was broken, the tablex
without its capacity to fulfil its previous functions, could still be called tablex
owing to the way in which it continues to participate in the worlds of other
processes surrounding it (relational justification).
The option of functional justification, that it is still capable of following
through certain functions it previously had, would need to answer the fol-
lowing query, What is the threshold of functionality, after which we say that
it is not tablex anymore? This would mean that one would have to mention
the functions that are determinative of tablex. However, such a functional
list is relative and would not enable a description of nature of tablex since
function is dependent upon agency of the users. One could of course point
out that the tablex was built for such functions and that is what must be
determinative of its identity. The risk we face is of cases where objects are
built for one purpose and used for completely others. Those who point out
that such are only exceptions would do themselves well to look at the uses
a table is often put to, from standing on it to reach a certain height to as a
play-toy for a child and in this spectrum of uses, the table is used for writing
amongst other normal functions.
The option of relational justification is employed by certain types of pro-
cess metaphysics, to talk about identity of the tablex. The identity of tablex
emerges from the relationships it has to the world around it: its functions
are also a product of such relationships, owing to the powers it possesses on
account of its organization. In the following section, this idea of relational
justification is explored followed by a discussion on status of numerical iden-
tity within process metaphysics.
7 Process and Its Interactions
In encountering the world, we come across objects which are concretely sep-
arate from one another. They have clear boundaries. It can be said that
they have spatiotemporal integrity which is preserved over time, through
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the changes they undergo. Their properties change, however, the substances
last. When asked, ‘What is it that lasts?’, a substantialist response is ‘The
essence.’ This gives the impression that the world keeps changing, that is, the
world of properties while the substances are transported across such changes
without any alteration to what-they-are. This could be the only way to
explain that the substances I encounter are the same I encountered a few
days, years, or decades ago. Continuity of identity is ensured by invocation
of essence. However, as mentioned earlier, a probe into essence reveals that
there is no reasonable access to such an essence. Process metaphysics is a
strong candidate to understand the identity of entities around us without
appealing to essence.
Process metaphysics posits two core categories: process and its interac-
tions 8. The world is populated by processes which possess ways of interacting
with the world.
[P] Process is emergent organization of constitutive interactions, di-
rected towards sustenance of interactive powers.
[E] Emergence is the development of global novelty from local interac-
tions.
[O] Organization is the mode through which constitutive interactions
are related to one another.
[IP] Interactive powers refers to the ways in which the process interacts
with the world around it.
[I] Interaction is situated adaptation to changes.
In a more detailed (and condensed) manner: There is a process. This
process is identified through the ways in which it interacts with the world
around it. (This is a manifestation of its powers). The process emerges as
a novel mode through the organization of its constitutive interactions. It is
this organization that makes it possible for the process it to interact with
the world in certain ways and at the same time, it is the ways in which the
process interacts with the world that conditions such an organization. This
means that the organizational mode of the process and its interactive powers
are in reciprocal dependency relationship with one another. To the question,
What is Tablex?, the answer is: It is an organization which emerges moment-
to-moment through its interaction with the world. This means that at any
8. This is in contrast to the category of substance and its properties within substance
metaphysics.
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point when we delve into identity of tablex, we consider the organization of
its constitutive interactions that enables it to have the interactive powers it
and the ways in which it interacts with the world around it.
7.1 From Compositional to Organizational Viewpoint
What is tablex made up of? Is it the atoms that are present in the spa-
tiotemporal region which the table occupies? Process metaphysics, as I have
espoused here, does not talk about the make-up of entities. The obsession
of substance-oriented metaphysics with make-up of entities has led to the
heaviest camping within metaphysics: monism, dualism, pluralism. These
positions are answers to the question: ‘What do you think the entities around
us are made up of?’: Are they made up of one kind of substance, maybe two
or many? The origin of emphasis on make-up of entities in substance meta-
physics comes from the idea that source of the powers of an entity is in virtue
of its substance, intimately related to the idea that the substance is insep-
arable from essence. Thus, essence is the source of powers of the entity. It
is only post the exposition of substance that one can conveniently explore
powers of the entities.
The shift within process metaphysics is to focus on the mode of organi-
zation, instead of the substance in which such a mode is realized. The mode
of organization of interactions is the source of powers of processes. Here,
power is interactive in nature, that is, it refers to the capacity of a process to
carry out a certain set of interactions with the world around it. The question
that process metaphysics is concerned with is: What enables the process x
to be able to interact in such-and-such ways with the world around it? The
answer to this is that it is the way in which its constitutive interactions are
organized that leads to emergence of the interactive powers of the process.
Thus, instead of focusing on the c/hunk, we focus on what occurs between
the constitutive interactions.
Those who complain that this reduces the nature of an entity to its be-
haviour alone or to the series of interactions view the entity as a substance to
which properties are attached. Such a substance moves across spatiotempo-
rality without alteration to its nature. This indicates an underlying loyalty
to essence. The more fitting question could be, ‘Is the tablex a process which
is reducible to its constitutive interactions?’. This question can be answered
by pointing out that it is the organization of constitutive interactions that
enables the interactive powers of the tablex. The emphasis is on viewing the
organization as causally relevant and not the material.
There could be a more difficult question that could open a can of worms
for a process metaphysician: This seems circular. Interactions are the source
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of interactive potential and interactive potential is the source of interactions.
Here, it is significant to differentiate between two forms of interactions:
the constitutive interactions and processual interactions. The criteria for in-
teractions to be considered constitutive is through their causal participation
in enabling interactive powers of the process. This means that only those
interactions which contribute towards the interactive powers of the process
will be considered relevant. Processual interactions are the interactions of
the process, as a whole, with the world around it. The individuation of
a process occurs through this method of acknowledging interactive powers.
Thus, as mentioned earlier, the constitutive processes enable the processual
interactions while the processual interactions condition the constitutive in-
teractions.
7.2 A rock, dog and me?
A possible objection to process metaphysics, as endorsed above, could be
that it fails to distinguish between the differences between entities of varying
complexity. What makes a rock different from my dog Martha? And what
makes Martha different from me? The difference between processes is in
the ways in which they interact with the world around them, the interactive
powers. If the kind of answer the questioner is looking for is: ‘A rock is
made up of so-and-so. A dog is made up of so-and-so. It is the internal
structure of the process which gives it its interactive potential.’, then I will
admit that such explanations are compatible with process metaphysics. Any
theory that intends to talk about the composition of processes is not at
odds with process metaphysics as long as it does not claim that powers of
the process are grounded in such a composition. The organization of the
interactions that occur within such supposed internal structures is source of
the interactive powers.
8 Coming back to Numerical Identity
In substance metaphysics, the main categories are substance and its proper-
ties. Substance is inseparable from its essence and it is through essence that
the numerical identity of an entity is sourced. Such an essence insulates the
substance from changes occurring over space and time. The powers of an
entity are owing to its essence. However, there is no epistemically systematic
access to such an essence. A metaphysical framework which can explain the
regularity of our experience of the objects along with role of change would
be a more adequate alternative. Currently, process metaphysics fulfils such
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a requirement, in better ways than substance metaphysics.
In process metaphysics, we encounter processes which possess varying
ways to interact with the world (interactive powers). Such processes are
emergent phenomenon- they emerge from the ways in which their constitutive
interactions are organized. The organization of such constitutive interactions
is the source of interactive powers and such a mode develops over time, so do
the interactive powers. No matter which matter we choose to compose our
world in, it is the ways in which they adapt to each other (situated adap-
tation to changes) that will determine the organization of the constitutive
interactions. Process metaphysics dismantles the concept of numerical iden-
tity by pointing out that we encounter processes in the world around us and
such processes are emerging moment to moment through their interaction
with the world.
What seems to the naked eye to be concrete singularity is a process, which
is continuously interacting with the environment to sustain its organization.
Change is inherent to process, as it is the adaptation to changes that de-
termines the constitutive interactions. Thus, process metaphysics enables
the accounting of regularity in our experience: the constancy of processes as
organizations of constitutive interactions along with accounting for change:
interactions as situated adaptation to changes.
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